6ddv8 Delimiter Hex-Split ObfuscationAn AutoIt obfuscation variant where hex-encoded payloads are split across hundreds of string-concatenation lines (`$VAR &= "..."`), each fragment polluted with the fixed five-character delimiter `"6dd
NtQuerySystemInformation Module EnumerationUsing `NtQuerySystemInformation` with `SystemModuleInformation` (class 5) returns the list of loaded kernel modules and their base addresses. Malware uses this to detect specific drivers (VM tools, ED
SeDebugPrivilege EscalationEnabling `SeDebugPrivilege` on the current process token grants access to any process on the system, bypassing standard DACL checks. Malware enables this privilege before injecting into or reading mem
AMSI Bypass via Byte-Signature PatchingA .NET defense-evasion technique in which the malware dynamically resolves `amsi.dll` exports (`AmsiInitialize`, `AmsiOpenSession`, `AmsiScanBuffer`), then scans the function prologues for known byte
AMSI Bypass Patch ByteSee [[amsi-bypass-byte-patch]] for the full technique description.
aspnet_compiler process-name sandbox evasionA behavioral sandbox-evasion technique in which malware checks the process list for the presence of `aspnet_compiler.exe` before executing its payload. The absence of this process indicates a non-deve
AutoIt Delimiter + Reverse String ObfuscationA simple but effective string-obfuscation pattern observed in AutoIt-compiled malware. The script encodes sensitive strings (API names, DLL names, payload data) by inserting a fixed delimiter between
AutoIt Hex-Split String ObfuscationAn AutoIt obfuscation pattern where hex-encoded payloads are broken into tiny fragments and distributed across hundreds of string concatenation lines (`&=`), each fragment polluted with a fixed delimi
autoit-overlay-script-placementPlacement of a compiled AutoIt v3 script in the file overlay (after the last PE section) rather than inside a `.rsrc` RT_RCDATA resource. This evades automated extraction tools such as `autoit-ripper`
AutoIt Shellcode XOR DecryptorA shellcode pattern observed across the [[unclassified-autoit-compiled]] cluster where an x86 shellcode stub, executed via `VirtualAlloc` + `DllCallAddress`, builds a variable-length XOR key on the st
AutoIt Stride-3 Hex String Decoder (L300YQJRH)A custom string-obfuscation function observed in compiled AutoIt3 single-file PE droppers. Decoded strings include API names (`kernel32.dll`, `GetTickCount`), type names (`dword`, `long`, `ptr`, `str`
AutoIt timing-gate sandbox evasionAn anti-debug / anti-sandbox gate implemented in AutoIt malware. The script records the value of `GetTickCount` before a `Sleep` call, sleeps for a known duration (commonly 500 ms), then records `GetT
Batch File Concatenation ObfuscationA DOS batch-script anti-static technique in which a binary payload is split into multiple fragments, each stored as a separate file with a meaningless name. A batch script uses hundreds of `SET` varia
Batch PowerShell Variable Expansion ObfuscationA DOS batch-script anti-static technique in which a PowerShell payload is fragmented across tens of `SET` variable assignments, then reassembled in a single line via `%VARNAME%` expansion and passed a
Caesar-3 Hex Shellcode StagingAutoIt malware pattern: shellcode bytes are encoded as a hex string (e.g., `0x558bec...`), then each character of the hex string is Caesar-shifted by +3, and the result is stored as a large string var
CallWindowProc Shellcode InjectionA process-injection technique that abuses the `CallWindowProcW` API from `user32.dll`. Because `CallWindowProc` accepts a callback address (`lpPrevWndFunc`) and up to four arguments, it can be repurpo
Character-Skip Cipher PowerShell ObfuscationA simple but effective static-avoidance technique used in PowerShell malware: sensitive strings (URLs, API calls, paths, headers) are hidden inside noise-padded literals. The decoder extracts every Nt
ClickOnce Certificate Trust BootstrapA signed PE installs its own Authenticode publisher certificate into the Windows `TrustedPublisher` store, then uses the `SPC_SP_OPUS_INFO_OBJID` (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.4.1.1) attribute inside that signatur
ConfuserEx ObfuscationConfuserEx is an open-source .NET obfuscator that rewrites managed assemblies to impede reverse engineering. It operates at the IL level, applying heavy name mangling, constant encryption, control-flo
CPlApplet PNG Payload DropperA two-stage dropper pattern where a `CPlApplet` DLL (often with a `.scr` extension) masquerades as a Windows screensaver. Instead of containing the malicious payload inline, it expects a companion fil
Debug-Build CAPA False PositivesWhen capa analyzes .NET assemblies compiled in Debug configuration, several compiler-generated attributes trigger ATT&CK technique matches that are semantically incorrect. The most common false-positi
Delphi VCL Certificate HarvestingA build/RE pattern where Delphi VCL RTL bloat inflates a small certificate-stealing payload into a 1.5–5 MB PE, making static triage noisy and behavioural analysis harder because the import table is d
Delphi VCL Native Stub → .NET Metadata LoaderA delivery chain in which a Borland Delphi VCL native PE32 executable acts as a dropper/loader for an inner .NET Framework payload. The .NET assembly is stored without a standard MZ+PE header — only r
DllCallAddress Shellcode ExecutionAn AutoIt-specific technique for executing shellcode reflectively. The AutoIt script decodes a payload (typically hex-encoded or XOR-encrypted shellcode), allocates executable memory via `VirtualAlloc
.NET Native AOT Compilation for Malware.NET Native AOT (ahead-of-time compilation via `PublishAot`) compiles managed IL into native machine code, producing a self-contained PE with **no CLR header, no IL metadata, and no COM_DESCRIPTOR dir
double-extension-masqueradeAbuse of Windows Explorer's "Hide extensions for known file types" default to present a malicious PE as a benign file type. The attacker appends a fake extension before the real one — e.g., `Payment_P
UAC Bypass via Event Viewer (eventvwr.exe)Auto-elevate bypass abusing the .msc file handler registration. Event Viewer (`eventvwr.exe`) is a signed Microsoft binary that auto-elevates; it shells out to `mmc.exe` using the `Shell\Open\Command`
Function Return-This Global ConstructionA JavaScript obfuscation technique used in Windows Script Host (WSH) environments to access the global `WScript` object without hardcoding its name. The idiom `Function('return this')()` constructs an
Fused String API DecodingA Go anti-analysis technique where Windows DLL names and their exported API names are concatenated into single large strings in `.rdata`, then sliced at runtime into individual `syscall.LoadLibrary` /
German LCID Sandbox GateA sandbox-evasion technique used by JScript droppers to restrict execution to German-speaking Windows systems. The script reads `HKCU\Control Panel\International\Locale` via `WScript.Shell.RegRead`, p
GetTickCount Anti-Emulation LoopAn anti-emulation technique that repeatedly calls `GetTickCount` (or `QueryPerformanceCounter`) and measures elapsed time between operations. Emulators and sandbox hooks often artificially speed up or
Go Function Name RandomizationAnti-static technique observed in Go-compiled malware where the `main` package functions are given random alphanumeric names at build time. The Go compiler preserves these names in the `.gopclntab`/`.
IFEO Offline Hive ParalyzeA technique to disable security tools by modifying the Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry hive offline — bypassing real-time AV hooks that monitor live registry writes.
JS Control-Flow Flattening + String-Array ObfuscationA JavaScript obfuscation pattern produced by the `javascript-obfuscator` npm package (or compatible tooling), observed in JScript/WScript droppers targeting Windows. Combines three anti-static techniq
js-custom-noise-obfuscationCustom JavaScript obfuscation technique characterised by embedding the real payload at the end of a massive noise block, then wrapping meaningful strings in a split-string array with comma-separated c
JS Dictionary Character Lookup ObfuscationA JavaScript obfuscation technique that maps a large set of natural-language keys (typically English words or phrases) to single ASCII characters, then assembles the real payload at runtime by concate
js-fixed-delimiter-concat-obfuscationJScript anti-static technique: split payload across hundreds of `+=` string-concatenation lines, interleaving a fixed noise token between every payload character. The noise token is stripped at runtim
JS Noise-Payload Reassignment EvalA hand-rolled JavaScript/JScript obfuscation technique that hides a real payload inside a massive repetitive noise string, then extracts it via sequential variable-reassignment statements and executes
JS Noise-Variable Concatenation ObfuscationJScript obfuscation technique where random-length noise variable names (15–20 lowercase characters, no semantic content) are assigned single-character string values, then concatenated via `+` operator
JScript Hex+ROT WMI Reflective DropperA three-stage JScript obfuscation pipeline followed by WMI hidden-process creation and a PowerShell reflective .NET assembly loader. Observed in Polish-language purchase-order spam lures.
JScript Sequential Variable Reassignment Eval ObfuscationA hand-rolled JavaScript/JScript obfuscation technique that hides a real payload by splitting every character into a separate variable assignment statement. Each unique variable name is assigned a cha
K30ZWMBJJ String ObfuscationA custom string-obfuscation function found in the decompiled AutoIt script of the `b017d189` sample. It protects shellcode-staging API names and file paths from static string extraction. The technique
Kill-Switch Domain CheckA malware sample contains a hardcoded domain or URL that it queries at startup (typically via HTTP GET). If the query succeeds — meaning the domain is registered, resolves, and returns any HTTP respon
LZSS Payload DecompressionLZSS (Lempel-Ziv-Storer-Szymanski) is a sliding-window dictionary compressor used by the SilverFox/ValleyRAT cluster to hide its second-stage payload inside the PE. At runtime, a small decompressor st
LZSS/XZ Embedded DecompressorCustom in-memory LZSS-style decompressor observed in the [[esmk-crypter-loader]] family. The engine uses a sliding-window hash table for match lookup and emits back-reference / length pairs. The magic
Marker File Mutex GatingA lightweight runtime gating mechanism: the dropper checks for the existence of a specific file (typically under `%appdata%` or `%TEMP%`). If present, the gated payload branch is skipped. If absent, t
MessagePack Asynchronous RAT ProtocolA .NET C2 wire-format protocol used by [[asyncrat]] and conceptually related to the [[protobuf-net-asymmetric-client-rat-protocol]] seen in [[quasar]]. MessagePack-serialized objects are transmitted i
MSVC Stub Data-Section Payload LoaderMalware build pattern: a small MSVC C++ outer PE carries an encrypted threat payload inside its `.data` section. At runtime the stub hides the console, delays execution via a PRNG-derived `Sleep`, all
Nibble-Encoded Resource PayloadA lightweight pre-decryption obfuscation layer observed in the [[esmk-crypter-loader]] family. Before the main decryption routine runs, the payload bytes extracted from the PE resource section are nib
NSIS LZMA Embedded Payload HidingMalware authors compile a Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) self-extracting installer and embed the malicious payload as one or more files inside the LZMA-compressed archive appended after the
P3059Y1DO Stride-3 Decimal String ObfuscationA custom string-obfuscation function used by the `unclassified-autoit-compiled` cluster of AutoItSC droppers. The function iterates over an input string in steps of 3, takes the first two characters o
PEB-Walking API ResolutionPosition-independent code resolves Win32 API addresses at runtime by walking the Process Environment Block (PEB) linked list of loaded modules, then traversing the export table of `ntdll.dll` or `kern
Phorpiex loader initterm payload stagingPhorpiex droppers (observed in the `dropped-by-phorpiex` corpus) use the MSVCR90 C runtime `initterm` / `initterm_e` callback arrays to execute a non-trivial payload *before* `main()` is reached. The
poem-word-list-steganographyA custom steganography technique where a malware author composes a fixed-length word list (typically 256 words to map directly to byte values 0x00-0xFF) written as natural-language prose — often a poe
powershell-cradle-downloaderA malware delivery pattern where a compiled binary (PE, .NET, or script) calls `powershell.exe -Command` (or `-EncodedCommand`) to execute a one-line or multi-statement payload string inline. The Powe
Process Hollowing Targeting svchost.exe / RegSvcs.exeA manual PE loader / process hollowing technique embedded in x86 shellcode dropped by the `unclassified-autoit-compiled` AutoItSC cluster. The shellcode decrypts an inner payload (typically a .NET ass
Process HollowingA defense-evasion technique where a benign process is created in a suspended state, its memory is unmapped or overwritten, and malicious code is written into the hollowed space before the thread is re
protector-lab-overlayProtector Lab (`plab`) is a commercial Windows PE packer / protector that encrypts the real payload into a large AES-256-GCM overlay appended to the end of the PE file. The outer stub is a MinGW-w64 o
Protobuf-net Asymmetric Client–RAT ProtocolA .NET remote-access trojan (RAT) communication pattern using protobuf-net as the serialization layer over an asynchronous TCP socket. The server acts as a listener; the client initiates an encrypted
Python-Packed PayloadMalware logic authored in Python, compiled to `.pyc`/`.pyo`, and bundled inside a Windows PE via PyInstaller, py2exe, or cx_Freeze. The outer PE is a stock bootloader; the actual IOCs, C2 logic, and e
raw-socket-ddos-flooderTechnique where malware opens `SOCK_RAW` (or `SOCK_PACKET`) sockets with `IP_HDRINCL` to craft Layer-3/Layer-2 packets directly. Used to generate high-volume DoS traffic with spoofed or randomised sou
RC4-encrypted PowerShell payload stagingA malware staging technique in which a PowerShell payload is encrypted with RC4 and delivered inside another script (e.g. JavaScript or batch). At runtime, the outer script decrypts the RC4 ciphertext
RC4 In-Place Section DecryptionThe PE's `.text`, `.data`, and import sections are encrypted with RC4 at build time. A small bootstrap stub embedded at entry point performs in-place RC4 decryption using a key derived from XOR-obfusc
RC4 + XOR Double-Stage Driver DecryptionA two-stage decryption routine where an embedded driver image is first decrypted with a hardcoded RC4 key, then passed through an additional XOR pass before being written to disk and loaded into the k
rdata-encrypted-payload-loaderMalware build pattern: the threat payload is encrypted and stored inside the `.rdata` section of a PE loader stub. At runtime the stub copies the ciphertext into a freshly allocated heap, decrypts it
Reflective Assembly Delegate ExecutionA .NET execution technique in which a byte array (decrypted from a resource, overlay, or network stream) is loaded into memory via `Assembly.Load(byte[])` and then invoked through `MethodBase.Invoke`,
Registry-Segmented Payload StagingA payload staging technique where a dropper splits a large string (Base64, hex, or raw) into fixed-size segments (typically 10 000–20 000 characters) and stores each segment as a separate `REG_SZ` val
RtlGetVersion OS Build GatingAn anti-sandbox / anti-emulation gate that resolves `RtlGetVersion` from `ntdll.dll` at runtime, fills an `OSVERSIONINFOEXW` struct, and validates `dwBuildNumber` against a hardcoded minimum (e.g. `0x
Rust Async RAT FrameworkA recurring build pattern observed in modern Windows RAT/stealer families: native Rust compiled with the MSVC toolchain, using `tokio` for async I/O, `tokio-tungstenite` for WebSocket C2, `serde_json`
S30K9CPG Caesar-5 XOR String ObfuscationA string-obfuscation function used in AutoIt-compiled droppers within the [[unclassified-autoit-compiled]] cluster. Decodes API names and DLL paths by subtracting 5 from each ASCII value, then XORing
Semantic Jargon Export ObfuscationA PE export table is populated with hundreds of plausible-sounding function names drawn from unrelated technical domains (machine learning, networking, game engines, DevOps). The names are syntactical
SendKeys PowerShell InjectionA defense-evasion technique where a Visual Basic or JScript dropper launches `powershell.exe` in a visible window, then uses `WshShell.SendKeys` to inject keystrokes into the PowerShell console as if
SmartAssembly ObfuscationSmartAssembly is a commercial .NET obfuscator/packer by Redgate. Malware authors abuse its string encryption, control-flow obfuscation, and anti-tamper features.
Social-Engineering Filename LureMalware distributors repackage benign or malicious executables with filenames that mimic legitimate business documents — purchase orders, invoices, shipping bills, payment advices, salary slips, RFQs
stolen-authenticode-certificate-signing**Technique:** Signing a benign or malicious binary with a stolen, expired, or revoked code-signing certificate to bypass Windows SmartScreen, application whitelisting, and user suspicion.
Trif32 Caesar-Shift-23 DecoderA trivial string-encoding utility class named `Trif32` that applies a Caesar cipher with a fixed shift of 23 positions (or equivalently, a left shift of 3). The string "Trif32" itself is likely a garb
U30JZ3SO7 Permutation-XOR String ObfuscationA custom AutoIt string-obfuscation function that hides API names and string literals inside compiled AutoIt3 scripts. It combines a **key-scheduled permutation** ( Fisher-Yates-like shuffle driven by
Unicode Control-Character Name Obfuscation.NET malware technique where all type names, method names, and sometimes field names are replaced with sequences of Unicode control characters (C0/C1 controls such as `U+0002`, `U+0003`, `U+0005`) and
Userinit Registry PersistenceAppending a payload path to the `Userinit` registry value under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon`, causing the payload to execute every time a user logs on.
version-info-masqueradeMalware alters the `VS_VERSIONINFO` resource block to claim a legitimate company name, product name, and file description. Windows Explorer, task managers, and AV reputation engines display this metad
WebDAV Regsvr32 DLL SideloadingA defense-evasion execution chain in which a script (JScript, batch, or VBScript) mounts an attacker-controlled WebDAV share via `net use \\host@port\DavWWWRoot\` and then calls `regsvr32 /s` to silen
WinInet + URLMon Dual-Path HTTP DownloaderA downloader that implements two independent HTTP fetch paths — a primary WinInet path (`InternetOpenW` → `InternetOpenUrlW` → `InternetReadFile` → `WriteFile`) and a fallback URLMon path (`URLDownloa
WMI System FingerprintingWindows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries used by JScript/WScript droppers to harvest victim-system metadata before exfiltration. Typically queries `Win32_OperatingSystem` for caption, architec
x64 Architecture Check via Program Files (x86)An anti-sandbox / anti-emulation gate that checks for the presence of the `%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Program Files (x86)` directory via `PathFileExistsW`. This directory only exists on 64-bit Windows installation
XMM Word-Wise Payload DecryptionA payload-decryption technique that uses SSE2 XMM registers to operate on 128-bit blocks of encrypted data in-place. The typical sequence is:
XOR-Encrypted PE Payload StagingA multi-stage payload delivery pattern where a secondary PE is written to disk encrypted with a repeating XOR key, then read back and decrypted in-memory by a shellcode loader before execution.
XOR string decryption loopA static string obfuscation technique observed in Zig-compiled malware where encrypted blobs and their XOR keys are stored in `.rdata`, then decrypted at runtime into stack-allocated buffers before us
XOR-decrypted .NET assembly reflective loadingA defense-evasion technique in which a malware payload encrypts a .NET assembly with a simple XOR cipher, decrypts it at runtime in PowerShell, and loads it reflectively into the current process via `
Z30PER Hex-Split String ObfuscationA string-obfuscation technique used in compiled AutoIt v3 scripts where plaintext strings are encoded as a sequence of 3-character groups. Each group consists of two hex digits representing one byte,
Zig-compiled malwareMalware compiled with the Zig programming language and its self-hosted compiler. Zig produces native PE/ELF/Mach-O binaries via LLVM/LLD with minimal runtime, making it an attractive target for author
Zone.Identifier ADS DeletionA defense-evasion technique to remove the "Downloaded from Internet" mark from a freshly downloaded file. Windows appends an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named `Zone.Identifier` to files fetched from t