Unclassified .NET Bitmap-Stego Loader
Umbrella label for a .NET Framework PE32 loader family characterized by embedding ~20 small bitmap resources (typically 76×76×24) that serve as encrypted payload or config carriers. Static analysis shows heavy name mangling, control-flow flattening, and System.Resources.ResourceReader stream extraction, but the final decrypted payload is not recoverable without dynamic execution.
Build / RE
- Format: PE32 (GUI) .NET assembly, minimal IAT (
mscoree.dll!_CorExeMainonly). ^[sample 4bf14434/pefile.txt] - Obfuscation: Random alphanumeric name mangling (not ConfuserEx base64), flattened IL dispatchers, encrypted strings.
flossyields no plaintext API names. ^[sample 4bf14434/floss.txt] - Resources: Repeated
System.Drawing.Bitmapobjects referenced in strings; binwalk confirms 20+ PC bitmap structures in.rsrc. ^[sample 4bf14434/binwalk.txt] - Masquerade: Fabricated VS_VERSIONINFO with nonsense company/product names and version
21.19.1.278. ^[sample 4bf14434/exiftool.json]
Deploy / ATT&CK
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading —
Assembly.Load/GetMethod/Invokestrings present; capa confirms. ^[sample 4bf14434/capa.txt] - T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion — Anti-VM Xen strings detected by capa. ^[sample 4bf14434/capa.txt]
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery — File existence/extension checks flagged by capa. ^[sample 4bf14434/capa.txt]
- T1036.002 Masquerading — Fake version-info block. ^[sample 4bf14434/exiftool.json]
Capabilities
- dotnet-manifest-resource-decryption
- bitmap-embedded-payload-steganography
- name-mangling-obfuscation
- control-flow-flattening
- version-info-masquerade
- reflective-assembly-loading
- anti-vm-xen-detection
- aes-deflate-stream-decryption-chain
- soap-http-client-protocol-reference
- bank-gui-masquerade-iban-cnp-transfer
- mixed-format-png-bmp-carriers
- pixel-extraction-rgba-channels
Related
- Fits under umbrella unclassified-pe32-dotnet but distinguished by systematic bitmap-resource payload hiding.
- bitmap-steganography-payload-delivery — Concept page for this technique
Notable Analyses
-
db0d6bc0(May 2022) — Second confirmed sibling. Version24.11.37.197, internal nameKKKKK.exe, filenamePurchase Order.exe, ~24 embedded bitmaps. Same build pattern, same obfuscation style. Static-only analysis. ^[/intel/analyses/db0d6bc0d73b6e2cf8dedde102e67ab2ad6233c9ff93f29be39351c1580dec8f.html] -
f74d8a51(Mar 2023) — Third confirmed sibling. Version20.3.49.113, internal nameNEW QUOTE.exe, filenameNEW QUOTE.COM, ~24 embedded bitmaps, fleet-maintenance GUI masquerade with OBD2/service-record/report-generation UI,SoapHttpClientProtocolSOAP reference,SHA256+ PRNG strings. Largest sibling at 984 KB. Static-only analysis. ^[/intel/analyses/f74d8a51625a7a66a4bdd5f569221bc492f5f61d6828fe6f9546368a040a5461.html] -
f6b5bdd5(Feb 2020) — Fourth confirmed sibling. Version11.9.34.178, internal namedjfcgvjhbkjnlm;,'.'.exe, filenamecopia del pago anticipado.exe, ~20 embedded bitmaps, Spanish payment-lure social engineering,BackgroundWorker-driven async staging,SoapHttpClientProtocol+System.Net.Socketsnetwork references. Earliest known build in cluster. Static-only analysis. ^[/intel/analyses/f6b5bdd5958eefc7f7e595ee8e91c2407193226acad0bfa939f3a1a42cf08396.html] -
f230118d(May 2026) — Fifth confirmed sibling. Version2.4.5.6, internal namefilr.exe, filenameDrawing_specification_and_August_PO_#07329.exe, 16 embedded bitmaps at 88×88×24 (fewer and larger than prior 76×76×24 siblings), explicitDeflateStream/System.IO.Compressionstrings suggesting AES+Deflate decryption chain, minimal GUI depth (no functional WinForms shell). Engineering-procurement lure. Static-only analysis. ^[/intel/analyses/f230118d14a393bc3af4ff150e719f215a2fe7a024734de1c44ce12b987a7706.html] -
d4d106f8(Jun 2026) — Sixth confirmed sibling. Version1.1.1.1, internal nameOrder.exe, filenameOrder.exe, 8 embedded bitmaps at 136×136×24 (fewer and larger than all prior siblings), bitmaps embedded in.textsection rather than.rsrc, event-registration / attendee-management GUI masquerade (RegisteredAttendees,TransferOffered,AttendeeRegistered,InjuryReported,registrationFee),System.Net.HttpwithoutSoapHttpClientProtocol, noDeflateStream/System.IO.Compressionstrings. Static-only analysis. ^[/intel/analyses/d4d106f84bafa58d7b26128c6c32f80ebdaa7c333fc341ed119405434dde2751.html]
| a497a066 (Feb 2020) — Seventh confirmed sibling. Version 10.21.32.8, internal name done.exe, filename vessel's_main_particulars.exe, 21 embedded bitmaps at 76×76×24 (highest bitmap count in cluster), maritime shipping-lure social engineering, RijndaelManaged + SHA256 strings, SoapHttpClientProtocol retained, no DeflateStream / System.IO.Compression. Leap-day build timestamp. Simplest AES-only decryption chain among siblings. Static-only analysis. ^[/intel/analyses/a497a066fe94fbfad7361eee98b725cc0c32be13bd0c1742d010a98c97a483d7.html]
f31920ba(Nov 2024) — Eighth confirmed sibling. Version1.0.0.0, internal namevdfj.exe, filenameOrder_PI.exe, 4 mixed-format carriers (3 PNG 256×256 RGBA + 1 BMP 129×128×32 + 1 PNG 513×513 RGBA) in.textsection (no.rsrcbitmaps), bank/purchase-order GUI masquerade (Bank,BankBLL,IBAN,CNP,TransferBL), pixel-extraction routines named_GClr/_AClrData/_PixProcess/_ProcessYCoords, no anti-VM, noSoapHttpClientProtocol, noDeflateStream/System.IO.Compression. Light obfuscation; no ConfuserEx. Static-only analysis. ^[/intel/analyses/f31920ba7bb3d9a49382e06cfe13eddee4c4375cacd93c74794f1c7ec342c707.html]
Note
No runtime C2 IOCs recovered; payload logic is ciphertext inside bitmaps. Requires detonation or manual bitmap extraction + decryption key recovery.