Quasar
Open-source .NET remote-access trojan (RAT) by MaxXor. Public on GitHub since ~2014. Modular client–server architecture with a builder GUI. Often seen in commodity trojan campaigns with little or no modification beyond C2 host/port configuration.
Build Stack Typically Observed
- Language: C# (.NET Framework 4.5.2 – 4.8)
- Target: PE32 CIL executable (sometimes AnyCPU)
- Linker: .NET 8.0 (from pefile
MajorLinkerVersionfield) ^[raw/analyses/0347df428374/0347df42report.md] - Libraries: protobuf-net (MessagePack-style TCP framing), BouncyCastle.Crypto v1.9 (TLS + cert handling), Gma.System.MouseKeyHook v5.6 (global keyboard hooking)
- No packer; no obfuscation on stock builds. Community variants sometimes packed with ConfuserEx or dotfuscator.
- Version resources:
Quasar Client,Quasar,Copyright © MaxXor YYYY,OriginalFilename: Client.exe
Deploy / TTPs Typically Observed
- C2: Protobuf-net serialized TCP channel. No hardcoded credentials in client binary; injected at build time. Default builder ports vary by campaign.
- Persistence: Registry Run keys (HKLM / HKCU) or
schtasksscheduled tasks. ^[raw/analyses/0347df428374/0347df42report.md] - Collection: Keylogging, screenshot capture, webcam capture, clipboard monitoring, browser credential recovery (Chrome/Chromium-based), WiFi password recovery, file manager.
- Execution: Remote shell via
DoShellExecute, file upload/download, reverse proxy (SOCKS-like tunneling), process kill, restart, shutdown. - Discovery: System info, geo-location, process list, network interfaces, drives, registry enumeration, WMI queries.
- Evasion: Stock builds have none. Modified variants may add anti-VM or sleep gates.
- Registry abuse: Run keys are manipulated with generic names like
ClientorWindows Updaterather thanQuasar. ^[raw/analyses/0347df428374/0347df42report.md]
Variants / Aliases
- No known aliases in the wild other than "Quasar" itself. Builder allows operators to rename the output file, so on-disk names vary (
nungcac.exe,svchost.exe, etc.). - Sibling SHA-256s in corpus (no deep reports yet):
24010dbf184c266f0f730e8be8b15e1401eddf2d72f33e5d5eab65b43942127b007c13a26d76a1281519960109bbf040ebdf5c497b00d4ffe0d0ac417cd8d33b62f608d61b28702ca4adadd574f3761c79860bd08da402e3129ab19176f7da9a4deebf56cf37840df28dcc8cbaaff10223300a0834f564aff2b89d3875abd90077193b76e7142383c2fb8f4c92891fa8eb0dd0f50ed206532ebd0abb93da9bc9
Capabilities
- tls-c2-protobuf-tcp
- registry-Run-persistence
- scheduled-task-persistence
- keylogging-global-hooks
- screenshot-capture
- webcam-capture
- remote-shell-execution
- file-manager-upload-download
- reverse-proxy-socks
- browser-credential-recovery-chrome
- clipboard-hijack
- process-enumeration-termination
- system-information-discovery
- wmi-queries
- geo-location-query
- anti-evasion-none-stock-builds
Related
- protobuf-net-asymmetric-client-rat-protocol — MessagePack-style framed TCP protocol observed across AsyncRAT and Quasar.
- dotnet-manifest-resource-decryption — .NET payload carriers (not applicable here but common in obfuscated .NET malware).
Notable Analyses
0347df42— Version 1.4.1.0 unobfuscated build, March 2023. Full static deep-dive. No CAPE detonation.0a47be72— Identical sibling build (Client-built.exe), same timestamp and ssdeep. No new TTPs.