f9a1fc01119ed1cc7a5464cc4df2d3f0dea09f8227c6ba101c77c73f6c379214Analysis Report: f9a1fc01119ed1cc7a5464cc4df2d3f0dea09f8227c6ba101c77c73f6c379214
Sample: Investec_-_Proof_of_payment_from_Phluid.bat.exe
SHA-256: f9a1fc01119ed1cc7a5464cc4df2d3f0dea09f8227c6ba101c77c73f6c379214
Size: 733,184 bytes (717 KB)
Platform: Windows GUI .NET Framework 4.0
1. Build / RE
Toolchain & Metadata
- Language / Runtime: .NET Framework v4.0.30319, CIL (MSIL) assembly. Compiled Mon Sep 2 07:48:54 2024 UTC. ^[file.txt] ^[rabin2-info.txt]
- Linker: Microsoft Linker v48.0. ^[exiftool.json]
- Assembly Name:
ComboBoxBind(namespaceComboBoxBind). Internal / original filename:mSmo.exe. ^[strings.txt:40] ^[strings.txt:84] ^[exiftool.json] - Version:
1.0.9011.19466. Copyright string: "Copyright 2019". ^[exiftool.json] - PDB:
mSmo.pdb— benign developer artifact, no path leakage. ^[rabin2-info.txt]
Packing & Obfuscation
- None detected. No ConfuserEx, SmartAssembly, Dotfuscator, or custom packer signatures. Strings are fully readable. ^[strings.txt] ^[capa.txt]
- No native packing: PE sections
.text(entropy 7.80 — normal for managed CIL),.rsrc,.reloc. ^[pefile.txt] - No CAPE detonation: skipped because no Windows guest available. Dynamic behavior is unobserved; static inference only. ^[dynamic-analysis.md]
Code Structure
- Entry classes:
ComboBoxBind.Program(STAThread),ComboBoxBind.MainForm,ComboBoxBind.PanelForm,ComboBoxBind.SettingsForm,ComboBoxBind.UsersForm. ^[strings.txt:108-112] - UI controls: Standard WinForms —
radioButton,button,numericUpDown,progressBar,pictureBox,checkBox,comboBox,groupBox,checkedListBox,textBox. ^[strings.txt:9-18] - Notable methods:
MainFormLoad— form initialization. ^[strings.txt:34]MainFormPaint— custom Paint event handler. ^[strings.txt:179]button1_Click— click handler. ^[strings.txt:100]RadioButton1CheckedChanged— radio-button state change. ^[strings.txt:35]Trif32/AddBufferToData— present in strings but Ghidra decompilation yields garbage (CIL thunk / unreachable block artifacts). Not actionable. ^[ghidra:AddBufferToData-00402cf8]
Anti-Analysis
- Absent. No debug checks, VM detection, or anti-disassembly tricks. ^[strings.txt]
- Capa flags: T1620 (reflective code loading) and B0013.001 (analysis tool discovery) — both false positives from standard .NET JIT / compile-time infrastructure. ^[capa.txt]
Signing
- Unsigned.
signed: falseper radare2; checksum 0x00000000. ^[rabin2-info.txt]
Embedded Resources
- Standard .NET manifest resources for each form (
ComboBoxBind.MainForm.resources, etc.) andProperties.Resources. ^[strings.txt:150-154] - No encrypted blob, no shellcode overlay, no steganographic carrier. ^[binwalk.txt] confirms only PE + version resource + manifest.
2. Deploy / ATT&CK
TTP Mapping
| Technique | ID | Evidence | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Masquerading | T1036 | Filename Investec_-_Proof_of_payment_from_Phluid.bat.exe impersonates a bank payment proof. |
high |
| Double Extension | T1036.007 | .bat.exe — user sees .bat, Windows executes PE. |
high |
| Ingress Tool Transfer | T1105 | Distribution vector (banking-themed email / Web portal). Inferred from filename only. | low |
Persistence
- None observed. No registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, services, or startup folder references in strings. Static-only; cannot rule out runtime behavior, but absence of any persistence API strings makes it unlikely. ^[strings.txt]
C2 / Comms
- None observed. No
HttpClient,WebClient,TcpClient, sockets, DNS resolution, SMTP, or any network API strings. ^[strings.txt] - No hardcoded URLs, IPs, or domains. ^[strings.txt]
Payload / Effect
- Benign .NET WinForms application. The binary implements a color-picker / combo-box binding demo (
ComboBoxBind,ShowPropertiesOfSlateBlue,DisplayKnownColors,KnownColorClass). ^[strings.txt:83,168,169,198] - No process injection, no credential harvesting, no file encryption, no data exfiltration. The threat is purely social engineering — a legitimate-ish program wrapped in a banking lure filename.
Attribution
- None. No language markers, no builder watermark, no code-family overlap with known malware. Generic .NET WinForms demo code. Compiler timestamp (Sep 2024) is the only temporal anchor.
- Filename pattern: "Investec" (South African bank) + "Proof_of_payment" +
.bat.exedouble extension. Consistent with commodity phishing / social-engineering distribution, not a targeted APT.
3. Verdict
Unattributed .NET Framework social-engineering dropper — empty payload.
The binary itself is a benign WinForms UI demo (ComboBoxBind / mSmo.exe). The only malicious attribute is its distribution filename: a bank-themed double-extension lure designed to trick victims into executing a PE while believing they are opening a batch file or document. No C2, no persistence, no payload. The actor’s intent was likely to deliver this as a stage-1 dropper; however, the sample we hold appears to be the decoy shell without the stage-2 attached, or the stage-2 was intended to be fetched / dropped by a separate component.
Confidence: High for the static characterization. Low for any dynamic behavior — CAPE did not execute. If a Windows guest becomes available, recommend re-queuing for behavioral confirmation.
References
- Static artifacts:
wiki/wiki/raw/analyses/f9a1fc01119ed1cc7a5464cc4df2d3f0dea09f8227c6ba101c77c73f6c379214/ - Wiki entity: unclassified-dotnet
- Wiki technique: version-info-masquerade