SHA-256:
a9b5e7469c35f0cd7da326f9894d002a8bbe77377a11bbc03551dcbadab3b47aa9b5e7469c35f0cd7da326f9894d002a8bbe77377a11bbc03551dcbadab3b47a
Filename:
Kopija_bankovnog_placanja.exe(Serbian banking lure). Static-only (CAPE skipped — no Windows guest). Confidence: low.
Build / RE
- Format: PE32+ executable (console) x86-64 Mono/.Net assembly, 2 sections ^[file.txt]
- Runtime: .NET Framework v4.0.30319 ^[strings.txt:3]
- Compiler: ILC / Native AOT toolchain (timestamp 2024-07-03 20:42:01 UTC) ^[pefile.txt:40] ^[rabin2-info.txt]
- Signing: Timestamped (Sectigo/USERTrust RSA chain) but unsigned — no valid Authenticode signature ^[binwalk.txt:7-10] ^[pefile.txt:138-139]
- Obfuscation: None observed (no ConfuserEx, SmartAssembly, or IL obfuscation). VS_VERSIONINFO is randomized word-salad (
CompanyName: Ufogohoqunuxuh,ProductName: Enuzojet,FileDescription: Agavinebuqa...) ^[pefile.txt:218-224] - Embedded resources: Standard
.rsrcsection (~17 KB) with RT_MANIFEST and VERSIONINFO; no encrypted payload blobs or bitmap stego ^[binwalk.txt] ^[pefile.txt:103-121] - Anti-analysis:
FreeConsolepresent ^[strings.txt:99] — typical console-hide for stealth. No VM/debug checks observed. - Notable strings:
AesManaged,CreateDecryptor^[strings.txt:59,224]Get_Malware^[strings.txt:111] — likely the entry-point or payload-retrieval method nameDataStore,DataStoreEntry^[strings.txt:114,306] — suggests in-memory or clipboard data stagingComplementaryStrings,CommaSeparatedValue^[strings.txt:148,236] — string-manipulation helpersGetText,SetText,IDataObject,System.Runtime.InteropServices.ComTypes.IDataObject.GetData^[strings.txt:48-55,266,293-294] — OLE clipboard API surfaceAmsiOpenSession,AmsiScanBuffer^[strings.txt:145,147,191-192] — AMSI API references (likely for bypass, not defense)kernel32.dll,Amsi_dll^[strings.txt:173-175]
Deploy / ATT&CK
| Tactic | Technique | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| DEFENSE EVASION | T1620 Reflective Code Loading | Capa detects invoke .NET assembly method and unmanaged call ^[capa.txt] |
| DEFENSE EVASION | T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information | AES-managed payload decryption implied by AesManaged + CreateDecryptor ^[strings.txt:59,224] |
| DEFENSE EVASION | T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | AMSI API strings (AmsiOpenSession, AmsiScanBuffer) suggest AMSI patch/bypass intent ^[strings.txt:145,191] |
| EXECUTION | T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter | .NET assembly with ExecuteMethod, GetMethod ^[strings.txt:65-66] |
| COLLECTION | T1115 Clipboard Data | Full IDataObject / GetText / SetText / OLE clipboard COM interop surface ^[strings.txt:48-55,266,293-294] |
| COLLECTION | T1123 Audio Capture | GetAudioStream, WaveAudio, audioBytes ^[strings.txt:177-178,204-205,233] |
- No dynamic evidence: CAPE detonation skipped (no Windows guest). All TTPs inferred from static strings/capa.
- No network C2 observed: No hardcoded URLs, IPs, or socket strings. C2 may be runtime-resolved or absent (stand-alone clipper).
- Attribution: None.
DataStore/Get_Malwarestrings overlap with ~10 other unattributed .NET samples in corpus, but none have family labels. The Serbian banking-filename lure (Kopija_bankovnog_placanja.exe= "Copy of bank payment") is common in Balkan-targeted crimeware.
Capabilities (chainable)
aes-managed-payload-decryptionamsi-api-bypassclipboard-hijack-ole-comaudio-capture-wave-streamconsole-hide-freeconsole
Related
- unclassified-dotnet — Umbrella entity for unattributed .NET malware.
- clipboard-hijack-cryptocurrency — Concept page for clipboard-based wallet replacement.
- dotnet-clipboard-ole-hijack — Technique page for OLE IDataObject clipboard manipulation in .NET.
Report written 2026-06-27. Static-only; dynamic confirmation pending CAPE Windows guest.