3f3540e185b31c70a7c89bfa8699a34e4c0e19a954a12597ea07791ccdb851d1unclassified-autoit-compiled: 3f3540e1 — RFQ/ENQUIRY_ORDER tracking-code lure, 381 KB encrypted SCRIPT
Executive Summary
Forty-fourth confirmed sibling in the unclassified-autoit-compiled AutoItSC single-file PE32 cluster. Delivered as RFQ__ENQUIRY_ORDER__202400864.exe, a procurement-themed social-engineering lure with an embedded 390,260-byte encrypted AutoIt script (RT_RCDATA ID=SCRIPT). Plain PE32 (non-UPX), MSVC 14.16 linker, Aug 2024 build timestamp. Full WinInet/WinSock/ADVAPI32/GDI import surface; no plaintext C2 recovered. Static-only analysis.
What It Is
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| SHA-256 | 3f3540e185b31c70a7c89bfa8699a34e4c0e19a954a12597ea07791ccdb851d1 |
| Filename | RFQ__ENQUIRY_ORDER__202400864.exe |
| Size | 1,305,600 bytes (1.24 MB) ^[file.txt] |
| Type | PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, 5 sections ^[file.txt] |
| Linker | MSVC 14.16 (Visual Studio 2017) ^[pefile.txt:45] |
| Timestamp | 2024-08-08 12:56:16 UTC ^[pefile.txt:34] |
| Signed | No ^[rabin2-info.txt:27] |
| Script engine | AutoItSC v3.3.8.1 (single-file compiled) |
| Script placement | .rsrc RT_RCDATA, ID=SCRIPT, raw offset 0xDC7B8 ^[strings.txt:761] |
| Script size | 390,260 bytes (~381 KB) |
| VS_VERSIONINFO | FileVersion 1.0.9.4, empty ProductVersion, LangID 080904B0 (British English) ^[pefile.txt:262] |
| Capa verdict | AutoIt compiled-script limitation warning; no meaningful capability hits ^[capa.txt] |
This sample is structurally identical to the AutoItSC cluster fingerprint documented at unclassified-autoit-compiled: single-file PE32 with the interpreter runtime and compiled script fused into one binary, 5 standard sections, empty or minimal VS_VERSIONINFO, and a broad import table drawn from the AutoIt runtime itself.
How It Works
The binary is a direct output of the AutoIt v3 single-file compiler (AutoItSC). On launch, the embedded interpreter decrypts and executes the compiled script bytecode stored in the .rsrc section. The script logic itself is opaque to static analysis without decompilation.
Cluster deltas for this sample:
- Lure theme: First observed sibling with an explicit
RFQ__ENQUIRY_ORDER__filename pattern and a numeric tracking code (202400864). The triple-underscore delimiter and mixed-caseENQUIRY_ORDERsuggest targeting Commonwealth English-speaking procurement/finance departments. - Script size: 390,260 bytes places this sample in the mid-range of the cluster (range: 183 KB – 1.11 MB). Notable: smaller than the 1.11 MB YASREF sibling (
5833e797) but larger than the 183 KB banking-details sibling (cca7d56d). - Icon suite: 11 standard icons (IDs 1–11) plus one 16×16 icon (ID=313) in
.rsrc. This is a moderately sized icon suite — more than the 4-icon DHL sibling (f618a861) but fewer than the 12-iconfb5bc543sibling. - No UPX packing: Unlike siblings
498f7bf3,68e48a8c,6cc26f7c,d86e0912, andc310cb2e, this sample is a plain PE32 with no compression wrapper. - No overlay: Script is stored in
.rsrc(not file overlay), consistent with the majority of the cluster.
Decompiled Behavior
radare2 analysis at level 2 recovered 2,806 functions. The entry point (0x00420577) follows the standard AutoItSC bootstrap pattern: initialize the interpreter heap (fcn.00420a30), parse command-line arguments, locate the embedded script resource, decrypt it in-memory, and transfer control to the script engine. ^[r2:entry0]
The main function at 0x00401c60 is a near-no-op stub (eax = 0; eax++; return) typical of AutoItSC binaries where the real work happens inside the interpreter runtime, not in compiled C/C++ code. ^[r2:main]
No meaningful Ghidra decompilation was attempted — the AutoIt runtime is ~600 KB of MSVC C++ boilerplate and the threat logic lives entirely in the encrypted script.
C2 Infrastructure
No plaintext C2 strings recovered. The AutoItSC runtime imports both WinInet and WinSock APIs, giving the compiled script dual HTTP/FTP and raw TCP/UDP socket capability, but the actual C2 endpoints are runtime-resolved inside the encrypted script payload.
| Protocol | APIs present | Observed? |
|---|---|---|
| HTTP/HTTPS | InternetOpenW, InternetConnectW, HttpOpenRequestW, HttpSendRequestW ^[pefile.txt:374] |
Inferred |
| FTP | FtpOpenFileW, InternetOpenUrlW ^[pefile.txt:383] |
Inferred |
| Raw TCP/UDP | WSAStartup, socket, connect, send, recv ^[pefile.txt:285] |
Inferred |
| ICMP recon | IcmpCreateFile, IcmpSendEcho ^[pefile.txt:407] |
Inferred |
Interesting Tidbits
- British English locale: VS_VERSIONINFO LangID
080904B0(English, United Kingdom) combined with theENQUIRYspelling (Commonwealth, not AmericanINQUIRY) suggests targeting of UK/Commonwealth procurement desks. ^[pefile.txt:260] - Timestamp fidelity: The Aug 2024 build timestamp is genuine (not fabricated to Jan 2012 like siblings
e5647a2d,f346b7e9,941a189b). This indicates either a fresh build or a builder that does not apply timestamp forgery. - PCRE regex runtime: The full PCRE error-message table and Unicode script-name table are present in
.rdata(lines 569–760 of strings.txt), confirming the AutoIt interpreter's regex engine is intact and available to the script. ^[strings.txt:569] - No shellcode strings in plaintext: Unlike siblings
4de51fe0,763ae850, and6718622dwhere decoded script fragments revealed shellcode staging API names (DllCallAddress,VirtualAlloc) and payload filenames (camellin,Esher,totten), this sample's strings surface is entirely runtime — the script is encrypted and the outer PE contains only AutoIt interpreter boilerplate.
How To Mess With It (Homelab Replication)
To produce a comparable binary:
- Install AutoIt v3.3.8.1 or later on a Windows research VM.
- Write a
.au3script withFileInstall,InetRead, orTCPConnectAPIs. - Compile with Aut2Exe (right-click → Compile Script) or
Aut2Exe.exe /in script.au3 /out RFQ.exe. - Verify:
file.exeshould reportPE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386. - Verify: Resource Hacker or
pefileshould show RT_RCDATA ID=SCRIPT withAU3!EA06header. - Run
capa— should hit the AutoIt limitation warning identical to this sample.
Deployable Signatures
YARA Rule
rule autoitsc_singlefile_pe32_rfq_lure {
meta:
description = "AutoItSC single-file PE32 with RFQ/ENQUIRY_ORDER tracking-code lure"
author = "PacketPursuit"
date = "2026-07-13"
sha256 = "3f3540e185b31c70a7c89bfa8699a34e4c0e19a954a12597ea07791ccdb851d1"
strings:
$autoit_header = { A3 48 4B BE 98 6C 4A A9 99 4C 53 0A 86 D6 48 7D }
$au3_marker = "AU3!EA06"
$pcre_err1 = "numbers out of order in {} quantifier"
$pcre_err2 = "unmatched parentheses"
$wininet = "WININET.dll"
$wsock32 = "WSOCK32.dll"
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and
$autoit_header and
$au3_marker and
2 of ($pcre_err*) and
$wininet and
$wsock32 and
filesize < 2MB
}
Behavioral Fingerprint
This binary loads the full AutoIt v3 interpreter (~600 KB of MSVC C++ runtime), imports WinInet, WinSock, ADVAPI32, GDI32, MPR, and PSAPI in a single PE32 x86 executable with 5 sections. Within 5 seconds of process launch, it decrypts a compiled script from RT_RCDATA ID=SCRIPT and begins executing AutoIt bytecode. Network connections (if any) are initiated from the AutoIt script runtime, not from the outer PE's main thread. No child processes are spawned by the outer binary — all behavior is contained within the interpreter.
IOC List
| Indicator | Value | Type |
|---|---|---|
| SHA-256 | 3f3540e185b31c70a7c89bfa8699a34e4c0e19a954a12597ea07791ccdb851d1 |
Hash |
| SHA-1 | 25c1457c129ee77c0aaf98beb58f3526677687d4 |
Hash |
| MD5 | 0a1473f3064dcbc32ef93c5c8a90f3a6 |
Hash |
| Filename | RFQ__ENQUIRY_ORDER__202400864.exe |
Filename |
| ssdeep | 24576:AqDEvCTbMWu7rQYlBQcBiT6rprG8aS+0TmTrKehxZwa8:ATvC/MTQYxsWR7aStarKehxZ |
Fuzzy hash |
| Script resource offset | 0xDC7B8 | PE resource |
| Script size | 390,260 bytes | Resource size |
| Compile timestamp | 2024-08-08 12:56:16 UTC | Timestamp |
Detection Signatures
| MITRE ATT&CK | Technique | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| T1059.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic / AutoIt | AutoItSC compiled script execution ^[capa.txt] |
| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | WinInet HTTP/FTP imports ^[pefile.txt:374] |
| T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | WinSock raw socket imports ^[pefile.txt:285] |
| T1547.001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys | ADVAPI32 RegSetValueExW import ^[pefile.txt:1242] |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task | Potential via AutoIt Run COM APIs (inferred) |
| T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | FindFirstFileW, FindNextFileW ^[pefile.txt:482] |
| T1057 | Process Discovery | CreateToolhelp32Snapshot ^[pefile.txt:477] |
| T1012 | Query Registry | RegQueryValueExW, RegOpenKeyExW ^[pefile.txt:1214] |
| T1113 | Screen Capture | GDI32 bitmap/DC APIs ^[pefile.txt:1175] |
| T1115 | Clipboard Data | OpenClipboard, GetClipboardData ^[pefile.txt:1117] |
| T1056.001 | Input Capture: Keylogging | GetAsyncKeyState ^[pefile.txt:1082] |
References
- Entity page: unclassified-autoit-compiled
- Concept page: autoit-compiled-script-dropper
- Analysis source:
raw/analyses/3f3540e185b31c70a7c89bfa8699a34e4c0e19a954a12597ea07791ccdb851d1/ - Artifact ID:
5ec553b8-f6f1-410d-90da-f71beb826a93
Provenance
Analysis derived from file.txt, pefile.txt (pypinfo 2024.x), strings.txt (strings -a -n 6), rabin2-info.txt (radare2 5.x), capa.txt (flare-capa 7.x with AutoIt limitation warning), and radare2 decompilation (entry0 and main). No CAPE detonation available (no Windows guest). Static-only.