000d931f8f76a4fc9ba255cbc972e03f58d3e49bcdd6008094ac0dc2e4fe25a6unclassified-dotnet: 000d931f — Third confirmed Pizzaria POS sibling (PO#86637_copy.exe)
Executive Summary
.NET Framework 4.0 WinForms point-of-sale / CRM application for a Brazilian pizza restaurant (Pizzaria_Management_VIEW), identical payload to siblings 7b3ef687 and 5ea6b79d. Distributed as PO#86637_copy.exe (purchase-order social-engineering lure). No network APIs, no persistence, no anti-analysis, no payload. capa T1213 / T1620 / B0013.001 flags are false positives from benign System.Data.SqlClient and Debug-build compiler-generated attributes. Third confirmed sibling in the Pizzaria cluster. Unsigned. Static-only analysis (CAPE skipped — no Windows guest).
What It Is
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| SHA-256 | 000d931f8f76a4fc9ba255cbc972e03f58d3e49bcdd6008094ac0dc2e4fe25a6 |
| File name | PO#86637_copy.exe (distribution), Euiz.exe (internal/original) ^[exiftool.json] ^[pefile.txt:237] |
| Size | 769,536 bytes (751 KB) ^[file.txt] |
| Type | PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.NET assembly, 3 sections ^[file.txt] |
| Timestamp | Tue Jul 30 02:06:30 2024 UTC ^[pefile.txt:34] |
| .NET runtime | v4.0.30319 (.NET Framework 4) ^[strings.txt:4] |
| Linker | IL linker v48.0 ^[exiftool.json:18] |
| VS_VERSIONINFO | FileDescription: Pizzaria VIEW, Comments: Pizzaria VIEW, LegalTrademarks: Valey Silicone, InternalName: Euiz.exe, OriginalFilename: Euiz.exe, FileVersion: 6.0.0.0, ProductVersion: 6.0.0.0, Assembly Version: 6.0.0.0 ^[exiftool.json] ^[pefile.txt:234-241] |
| PDB | Not present in strings |
| Signed | No ^[rabin2-info.txt] |
| Packed | No ^[pefile.txt:92] (.text entropy 7.96 — typical compiled CIL) |
| Obfuscated | No |
| Anti-analysis | None observed |
How It Works
Standard .NET Framework 4.0 Windows Forms GUI application implementing a pizza-restaurant management system. Namespace Pizzaria_Management_VIEW contains forms for customer registration (CadCliente, GerenciamentoCadastro), order management (CadPedido, GerenciamentoPedido), product/stock control (CadProduto, GerenciamentoEstoque), and employee management (CadFuncionario). ^[strings.txt:53-125]
Database layer: ClienteDAL (Data Access Layer) under DAL.Model namespace exposes BuscarClientePorID, ListarClientes, InserirCliente, AtualizarCliente, ExcluirCliente using System.Data.SqlClient (SqlConnection, SqlCommand, SqlDataReader, SqlParameter). ^[strings.txt:54-56] ^[strings.txt:78-80] ^[strings.txt:221] ^[strings.txt:251-253] ^[strings.txt:288-290]
UI layer: Full WinForms MDI application with TabControl, MenuStrip, DataGridView, PictureBox, DateTimePicker, MaskedTextBox, and ComboBox controls. ^[strings.txt:12-50] Portuguese-language menu items (pedido, produto, estoque, login, funcionário, cadastro, gerenciamento, data). ^[strings.txt:163-200]
Embedded resources: Multiple .resources blobs for each form (Pizzaria_Management_VIEW.CadCliente.resources, etc.) plus a Properties.Resources.resources icon/data bundle. ^[strings.txt:274-283] Binwalk confirms four embedded PNG images (256×256, 400×226, 256×256, 508×508). ^[binwalk.txt]
String decoder: Trif32 method at strings.txt line 27 is the trivial Caesar-shift-23 decoder shared across the PrimeraVentana/GoldenCity/MyPaint.Editor/Ivanov_WF_Paint/Pizzaria coursework cluster. Likely decodes an embedded SQL connection string or localized UI string block. No cryptographic sophistication. ^[strings.txt:27]
Build / RE
Toolchain: Visual Studio 2019/2022 Community, .NET Framework 4.0, C# WinForms Application template, IL linker v48.0. ^[exiftool.json:18] ^[strings.txt:316] InitializeComponent present (standard VS designer output). ^[strings.txt:316]
Packing / obfuscation: None. Single-section .text with entropy 7.96, no packer signatures, no obfuscator artifacts. ^[pefile.txt:92] No SmartAssembly, ConfuserEx, or Xenocode markers. No control-flow flattening, no string encryption beyond the trivial Trif32 decoder.
Anti-analysis: None. No debug checks, no VM detection, no time-bombs, no process enumeration. No System.Diagnostics.Debugger references. No IsDebuggerPresent. No AmsiScanBuffer / AmsiOpenSession. ^[strings.txt] ^[floss.txt] (floss errored on invocation — no decoded strings extracted).
Code quality: Designer-generated WinForms with hand-written ClienteDAL data-access layer. Student-grade or small-business quality. Consistent with a Visual Studio drag-and-drop CRUD tutorial application.
Signing: Unsigned. No Authenticode certificate. PE checksum invalid (0x0). ^[rabin2-info.txt] Not a stolen-certificate sibling (unlike 5ea6b79d).
Notable functions: radare2 level-3 analysis yielded 195 functions — all standard .NET method stubs and compiler-generated attributes. ^[r2:analysis.log] The only import is mscoree.dll!_CorExeMain (standard .NET bootstrap). No P/Invoke signatures, no native API calls, no DllImport attributes. No suspicious control-flow patterns.
Deploy / ATT&CK
Persistence: None. No registry writes, no scheduled tasks, no startup-folder placement, no service creation. No Microsoft.Win32.Registry persistence APIs. ^[strings.txt]
C2 / Network: None. Zero System.Net, System.Net.Sockets, System.Net.Http, System.Net.WebClient, System.Net.Mail, or System.IO.Pipes references. No hardcoded URLs, IPs, domains, or C2 infrastructure. ^[strings.txt] ^[pefile.txt] ^[r2:imports]
Lateral movement / exfil: None. No file-sharing APIs, no WMI, no PsExec, no RDP APIs, no COM/DCOM remoting.
capa → MITRE ATT&CK mapping (with false-positive annotations)
| capa Capability | ATT&CK | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| reference SQL statements | T1213 Data from Information Repositories | False positive — benign System.Data.SqlClient ADO.NET CRM queries ^[capa.txt] |
| invoke .NET assembly method | T1620 Reflective Code Loading | False positive — standard System.Reflection JIT metadata and Debug-build compiler attributes ^[capa.txt] |
| reference analysis tools strings | B0013.001 Analysis Tool Discovery | False positive — generic .NET runtime match ^[capa.txt] |
| compiled to the .NET platform | — | Accurate ^[capa.txt] |
| access .NET resource | — | Accurate — embedded PNG icons ^[capa.txt] |
| terminate process | C0018 Terminate Process | Accurate — standard Application.Exit / form close ^[capa.txt] |
Attribution: None. Brazilian Portuguese UI strings (pedido, produto, funcionário, estoque, gerenciamento) and Valey Silicone developer/company name in VS_VERSIONINFO suggest Brazilian origin. ^[strings.txt:163-200] No code-reuse overlaps with known malware families. The distribution filename (PO#86637_copy.exe) follows the purchase-order social-engineering pattern observed across 40+ samples in the unclassified-dotnet cluster. The _copy suffix suggests manual filename modification by the distributor.
Dynamic behavior: CAPE skipped — no Windows guest available. Static-only inference. No reason to expect any runtime behavior beyond launching the WinForms MDI application and attempting SQL Server connection on form load.
Interesting Tidbits
- Third confirmed sibling — payload is byte-for-byte identical (or near-identical) to
7b3ef687and5ea6b79d(samePizzaria_Management_VIEWnamespace, sameClienteDALmethod names, sameTrif32decoder, same Portuguese menu strings, same embedded PNG resources). The only meaningful deltas are: (1) internal name (Euiz.exevsDzAz.exevsYhdk.exe), (2) distribution filename (PO#86637_copy.exevsproducts-list.exevs52oTaV20K4bWnvN.exe), and (3) signing status (unsigned vs unsigned vs stolen Simon Tatham certificate). ^[strings.txt] ^[pefile.txt] - No PDB path — like sibling
7b3ef687, no PDB reference in strings. Suggests Release build or PDB stripping before distribution. - Plausible timestamp — 2024-07-30 02:06:30 UTC is consistent with the Jul 2024 build date of the cluster. Not future-dated or fabricated.
- floss failure — flare-floss errored on invocation (
invalid choiceargument parsing), producing no decoded strings. The .NET strings are already visible in plaintext; floss offers no advantage overstrings -elfor CIL metadata. ^[floss.txt]
Sibling Comparison
| Sample | Internal Name | Distribution Filename | Signed | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
7b3ef687 |
DzAz.exe |
products-list.exe |
No | First observed sibling ^[/intel/analyses/7b3ef6871b0c4d64dd7fd96937c190763fae58bd560131b96dbc9ef860c75e54.html] |
5ea6b79d |
Yhdk.exe |
52oTaV20K4bWnvN.exe |
Yes (stolen Tatham) | Second sibling, same stolen cert cluster ^[/intel/analyses/5ea6b79d0efa5db5514fb0eb7f6307d35e504425a3af39bd226c22ac39121603.html] |
000d931f |
Euiz.exe |
PO#86637_copy.exe |
No | This sample — third confirmed sibling |
Deployable Signatures
YARA rule
rule PizzariaVIEW_Benign_DotNet
{
meta:
description = "Brazilian pizza-shop POS/CRM .NET WinForms application (benign, false-positive prone)"
author = "PacketPursuit"
hash = "000d931f8f76a4fc9ba255cbc972e03f58d3e49bcdd6008094ac0dc2e4fe25a6"
date = "2026-07-15"
strings:
$ns1 = "Pizzaria_Management_VIEW" ascii wide
$ns2 = "ClienteDAL" ascii wide
$ns3 = "BuscarClientePorID" ascii wide
$ns4 = "CadCliente" ascii wide
$ns5 = "CadPedido" ascii wide
$ns6 = "CadProduto" ascii wide
$ns7 = "GerenciamentoCadastro" ascii wide
$ns8 = "GerenciamentoPedido" ascii wide
$ns9 = "GerenciamentoEstoque" ascii wide
$vi1 = "Pizzaria VIEW" ascii wide
$vi2 = "Valey Silicone" ascii wide
$trif = "Trif32" ascii wide
$dotnet = "v4.0.30319" ascii wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and
($dotnet or $trif) and
(2 of ($ns*) or $vi1 or $vi2)
}
IOC list
| Type | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| SHA-256 | 000d931f8f76a4fc9ba255cbc972e03f58d3e49bcdd6008094ac0dc2e4fe25a6 |
Primary sample |
| MD5 | 6dbb55ad41b3fa7a5316abe08d8b9480 |
^[capa.txt] |
| SHA-1 | 53a5bea8b8b20dd305410679fb8aa47e83948328 |
^[capa.txt] |
| ssdeep | 12288:ZQlH2aJzrnZZ1JQMOKFAJvCRUqE76Nir5bepToBrhcgFR2dZUdfx5DiA7Gs0lc:ZCHtJXNJQqaJ+GCir5STP4R2jUdZ97Gu |
^[triage.json] |
| Filename (dist) | PO#86637_copy.exe |
Purchase-order social-engineering lure |
| Filename (internal) | Euiz.exe |
Original build name |
| Version info | Pizzaria VIEW / Valey Silicone / 6.0.0.0 |
^[exiftool.json] |
| .NET namespace | Pizzaria_Management_VIEW |
Unique cluster identifier |
References
- Artifact ID:
f73b76ea-a89d-47be-9e74-edc2e3266f7b^[metadata.json] - Source: OpenCTI / MalwareBazaar
- Related wiki: unclassified-dotnet
- Related concepts: social-engineering-filename-lure, social-engineering-purchase-order-masquerade, trif32-caesar-shift-23-decoder, debug-build-capa-false-positives
Provenance
Analysis produced from:
file.txt,exiftool.json,pefile.txt,strings.txt,ssdeep.txt,tlsh.txt,yara.txt,metadata.json,triage.json— automated triage pipeline (May 2026)floss.txt— FireEye flare-floss (errored on argument parsing, no decoded strings) ^[floss.txt]capa.txt— Mandiant flare-capa static analysis ^[capa.txt]binwalk.txt— embedded artefact scan ^[binwalk.txt]rabin2-info.txt— radare2 binary header summary ^[rabin2-info.txt]dynamic-analysis.md— CAPE skipped (no Windows guest available) ^[dynamic-analysis.md]- radare2 level-3 analysis (195 functions, 1 import, no suspicious patterns)
- Python byte-scan for network indicators, Base64 blocks, and P/Invoke signatures (negative)